Archive for July, 2007



Pin-drop silence from defenders of free speech

The Graun reports:

Spanish police were ordered to raid newsagents across the country yesterday to remove copies of a satirical magazine deemed to have offended the country’s royal family by publishing a cartoon of the heir to the throne having sex.

The cartoon on the front cover of El Jueves magazine showed Crown Prince Felipe and his wife Letizia in the midst of an ardent session of love-making.

A speech bubble issuing from the prince’s mouth makes a joke about the amount of work done by the royal family and a government decision to give families €2,500 (£1,680) for each new child.

Up to two years in jail awaits these cartoonists.

Pure

Surprise, surprise

Daniel Tubes promotes the use of terrorism against Muslims.

In the article he goes on praise Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MeK), a Marxist-Islamist organisation listed by both the US and UK as terrorist outfit.

Not only that, but the Council on Foreign Relations suggests they might have killed American servicemen in Tehran during the 1970s.

So, Daniel Tubes supports not only a terrorist outfit to terrorise Iranian Muslims, but also a group that might have killed his own countrymen.

Religion and politics in Qom

From the Economist:

Why suppose that Qom of all places might become an agent of change? Conventional wisdom from afar saw the success of Khomeini’s revolution as Qom’s victory too. Didn’t the revolution stop modernisation in its tracks and jerk Iran back to the Middle Ages, delivering political power to turbaned clerics in thrall to an unfathomable theology? And does it not follow that the turbaned clerics of Qom have a strong belief, buttressed by a strong vested interest, in preserving the theocratic principles of that revolution?

As a matter of fact, no. Khomeini’s central idea, the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, gives the Islamic Republic its theological underpinning. This holds that until the appearance of the Shias’ “hidden imam” (of which more below) society should be governed by a supreme leader, the clerical judge best qualified to interpret God’s will and the meaning of Islamic law. It is this doctrine that makes Ayatollah Khamenei supreme leader and all others subordinate to him. But Qom itself has never felt completely at ease either with Ayatollah Khomeini’s idea or Ayatollah Khamenei’s succession. Indeed, many of the most revered clerical minds in Qom see this doctrine, and especially the way it has been implemented since Khomeini’s death, as negating their tradition.

There’s some more:

It is not clear exactly how the theological arguments of Qom travel from the seminary into Iran’s politics, but they do. President Khatami’s reform movement drew heavily on the views of clerics, some of whom were astonishingly outspoken. One, Hojatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar, began to argue in the 1990s that Iran could not have clerical rule and claim to be a democracy at the same time. He was jailed for saying that the freedom Iranians had sought through their revolution was being replaced by a new clerical despotism. From house arrest, Grand Ayatollah Ali Hossein Montazeri, a revered cleric who was Khomeini’s designated successor before complaining too much about the mass execution of political prisoners after the war with Iraq, supported Hojatoleslam Kadivar. “What the conservative leaders are practising today is not Islam, and I oppose it,” he said.

Such criticisms are especially damaging to the present supreme leader. Ayatollah Khomeini was not just the father of the revolution but also a charismatic scholar of immense learning. In the eyes of Qom, Ayatollah Khamenei is by contrast a clerical lightweight (but effective politician) whom Khomeini prematurely fast-tracked to ayatollahdom when he was looking for a successor. What was acceptable in the charismatic is not necessarily acceptable in the apparatchik.

Although the government has tried to stifle dissent, Qom remains an argumentative place, continuing to exert a potentially disruptive influence on politics. Even during the present crackdown, the visitor to its seminaries quickly encounters a spectrum of clerical opinions on everything from velayat-e faqih to the wearing of the hijab to relations with Israel and America. “Qom’s seminary is like an ocean in which you can find anything you desire,” Hojatoleslam Kadivar told a recent interviewer from Asharq Al-Awsat, a pan-Arab daily.

To sample the range of opinion, meet two clerics from opposite ends of this spectrum. Hojatoleslam Fazel Maybodi teaches at Qom’s Mofid University, a traditionally liberal seminary. A jolly, grey-bearded cleric proud of his smattering of English phrases, he explains at once that although Qom is not a place for political decision-making—that is the job of the government—“theoretical” debate about Islam’s relationship with politics takes place freely. On velayat-e faqih he says that the views of the most senior ayatollahs are not uniform. For example, Ayatollah Sistani, a revered cleric based in Iraq but also widely admired in Iran, has approved Iraq’s post-Saddam constitution. This gives ultimate authority to elected politicians rather than clerics. “I don’t believe that all political ideas should come from within Islam,” says Hojatoleslam Maybodi. “Politics is an experimental, man-made activity and Islam should respect it.”

Announcement: Muslims Against Movements

LONDON: With the launch of yet another Muslim movement, I have today announced the creation of Muslims Against Movements.

All those Muslims sick of “movements” cropping up everywhere can join my non-movement. However, I shall restrict membership to just one person to ensure MAM does not resemble a movement.

The Lack Of Any Causal Chain

I argued, if in an estoeric way, that too much Muslim analysis breaks down into a simplistic causal chain, where Muslims are only ever reacting to what America, the West, etc. does. As if Muslims have no desires, aims, methods, goals of their own — as if the Americans et al. are not susceptible to ‘reaction’ too.

On the other side of this “debate” are people who think like this:

“Why are there terrorists who are Muslims?”

“Because they’re evil!”

Does this help anymore than bad analysis by Muslims? These peolpe view Muslim actions in some sort of vaccum. Often this other universe Muslims inhabit contains them just them and their religious texts, especially the Qur’an:

Why are there terrorists who are Muslims?”

“Because they’re religion is evil and their Holy Book says so!”

Both views are nonsense.

No comment required

Australia admit to the biggest open secret in the world

War for oil:

Australia has admitted that securing oil is a key factor behind its continued troop deployment in Iraq.

It is the first time such an admission has been made, correspondents say.

Defence Minister Brendan Nelson said that maintaining “resource security” in the Middle East was a priority for the government in Canberra.

But he added that the main reason troops were still in the Gulf was to ensure that the humanitarian crisis there did not worsen.

Australia was involved in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and has about 1,500 military personnel still deployed in the region. There are no immediate plans to bring them home.

Revolutionaries and reformers

“Revolutionaries and reformers all make the same mistake. Lacking the power to master and reform their own attitude towards life, which is everything, or their own being, which is almost everything, they escape into wanting to change others and the external world. Every revolutionary, every reformer, is an escapee”.

— Fernando Pessoa

Angry Arab calls out Arab Muslim activists

I’ve enjoyed reading some of Angry Arab’s views on Pakistan, as it is not a view point I am familiar with. He notes the following:

There is such sympathy for the Palestinians in this country. There is also interest in Arabic and in Arab affairs. I was told that there are some 900 students at the Department of Arabic at the International Islamic University here, and they use the same curricula used in Arab universities. I gave an Arabic lecture at the Usul Ad-Din Department at the university, and students’ Arabic was quite advanced I noticed. In the Arab world: there is a bit of arrogance–even among Islamic-minded activists–toward non-Arab Muslims. How many Arab Muslims, for example, study Urdu or Persian or Turkish? I know that the comparison has to take into consideration the religious significance of the Arabic language, but the observation still holds, I think. Thus far, I have noticed that the Saudi government is quite unpopular here: people are generally opposed to the pro-US governments in the region (including their own).

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